Abstract. Ubiquitous systems will integrate computers invisibly and unobtrusively in everyday objects. Information will appear in new forms, i.e. data will be catched from single or multi-sensor devices and will be used for context extraction. New location-based services will be adapted to user preferences. For this the ubiquitous system needs to know user profiles, likings, and habits. As the user moves these information have to be sent to the new location of the user. Either the user carries her data on wearable or portable computers or the ubiquitous environment takes responsibility for transporting them. The amount of new devices and services makes an efficient use by centralized systems very difficult. The idea presented in this paper is that a virtual reflection of the user represented by a mobile agent accompanies her in the ubiquitous environment. Mobile agents offer a possibility to encapsulate information of a person and her preferences and perform location-based services of the ubiquitous system in the name of the user. Because of the personal data security and privacy are major concerns of such an agent system. This paper describes a ubiquitous mobile agent system named UbiMAS which has security extensions to provide high protection of agents and significant personal data. UbiMAS is used in a smart office environment with smart doorplates.
Introduction
Future computers will be integrated in objects of everyday life. The user shouldn't perceive these computers in his familiar environment. Ubiquitous systems should be invisible and unobtrusive. A further fundamental feature is their knowledge of context information. Context is the situation arising by realization and interpretation of environmental information. Single or multi-sensor boards [14] are developed to be used in smaller and more powerful intelligent environments. These devices can build a sensor-network and communicate with each other over wireless media. To include the location of a person into the context information different location-tracking systems can be used [5] . Additionally personal
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Several research projects exist for smart office and home environments. The Active Badge system described in [19] is an IR-based location tracking system. It is used in an office scenario, where phone calls are redirected to the current location of the user. The Aware Home project [11] aims to built a ubiquitous house to create a living laboratory for research in ubiquitous computing for everyday activities. Using various sensors new applications are implemented like the identification of person over a Smart Floor or finding Frequently Lost Objects (FLO). Mozer [13] proposes an Adaptive Control of Home Environments (ACHE). ACHE monitors the environment, observes the actions taken by inhabitants, and attempts to predict their next actions. All of these projects are one-server-centric. We chose with our reflective mobile agents a distributed approach obviating central point storage of information.
The idea of using mobile agents in ubiquitous environments appears in several projects. In [9] a flexible mobile code approach is described which is used in a ubiquitous and active augmented reality system. The user inspects the world through this AR system and is tracked by a location-tracking system. When she enters a space of a real object which has an active tag, a mobile code is downloaded on the user's device and is executed by a Mobile Code Engine (MCE). The mobile code contains executable information, e.g. appropriate user interfaces, but it is not a mobile agent system because the mobile code isn't autonomously performing a service.
The Hive system [12] is a distributed agent platform for building applications by networking local system resources. Agents are used to control devices in ubiquitous computing environments. Hive also supports agent migration. However the agents here are simply remote objects, e.g. buttons, without an agent communication infrastructure.
[16] and [17] describe a framework which is very similar to our approach. The framework provides a way for mobile agents to follow their users as they move around and to adhere to places as virtual post-its. However the papers describe only a framework and shift the security issues to the used agent system and the Java Virtual Machine.
Security in mobile agent systems is examined in multiple research projects. [3] describes a security concept where mobile agents only migrate to trustful nodes. [15] replaces the concept of trust by a concept of reputation. Agents can increase or decrease the reputation of nodes dependent on the experiences that they make with the nodes. To protect against occupation of node resources by agents [10] defines a restriction on the number of times an object can be accessed. These projects influenced our security approach which more specifically targets the requirements of ubiquitous environments.
Reflective Agents on Smart Doorplates
Reflective agents accompany persons in the ubiquitous environment and carry user specific data. In order to examine this idea in a real scenario we mounted touch screens at each door of an office building replacing fixed doorplates. These Smart Doorplates [2] offer a platform for several services. Users of the services are employees, i.e. the office owner, and visitors of the building. Employees have their personal reflective agent, which resides in the environment and contains data about the employee. The data consists of basic user information like name, office room, etc. and security data like private and public keys, user names and passwords of the owner used for communication, data security, and access operations. Furthermore the agent stores context information belonging to the user and updates these data automatically.
The doorplates serve also as interface between user and agent. The user can instruct her reflective agent to perform services in her name. The reflective agent communicates with service agents and passes on the instructions. If the user moves to a new location the reflective agent migrates to the doorplate next to the user. The user location is determined by an RFID tracking system. The user must only carry an RFID tag. This mobile agent model is implemented in UbiMAS. The UbiMAS architecture is described in the following subsection.
UbiMAS Architecture
The ubiquitous mobile agent system UbiMAS is implemented as a service running on top of middleware systems. Currently, UbiMAS is based on the Autonomic Middleware for Ubiquitous eNvironments named AMUN [18] . UbiMAS services run on top of AMUN besides other services like a location tracking service.
AMUN is designed with the goal in mind to foster the device independent application of autonomic computing demands proposed by IBM in ubiquitous environments [7] . AMUN uses the peer-to-peer system JXTA [8] as communication infrastructure. Communication in JXTA is realized by three kinds of pipes: propagate, input and output pipes. If two JXTA peers want to exchange messages directly they arrange input and output pipes for unlimited and bidirectional communication. AMUN uses an event-based approach for message delivery. It offers services the interfaces needed to exchange messages over middleware pipes. Each service defines its own message type. When a message arrives AMUN analyzes the message type and generates an event for the registered services. An Event Dispatcher offers services the functionality to send messages and to register themselves as listeners to specified types of messages. In this manner the services can register for different message types and get informed when one of these messages arrive. So each application decides if it wants to receive sensor, location, middleware or other kinds of messages. UbiMAS defines an own message type. UbiMAS nodes that are implemented as AMUN services register for this UbiMAS message type.
UbiMAS consists of two parts: the UbiMAS basic platform and the UbiMAS extensions. The UbiMAS basic platform defines abstract agent nodes and the interface for agent implementations. It realizes the basic communication functions between nodes and agents and several security concepts.
The UbiMAS extensions part implements the application specific components, i.e. the reflective user agents and the service agents. Furthermore the communication functions are extended here with secure agent-agent and agentnode methods to fulfill the requirements of the Smart Doorplate application.
This separation in a basic and an extensions part makes a broad usage of UbiMAS possible.
The UbiMAS Node Service
To host UbiMAS agents each peer has to start at least one UbiMAS agent node as service on top of the middleware (see Figure 1) .
UbiMAS implements additional communication protocols for agent and node communication and for agent migration. All messages are acknowledged in Ubi-MAS what is not implemented by the base middleware.
If a middleware peer receives a UbiMAS type message it informs the node sending an event on which the node listens. UbiMAS nodes implement a Message Delivery component which receives the events sent by the middleware and processes the incoming messages. If the node wants to send a message it forwards it to the Message Delivery where the appropriate header information are set.
If the receiver of a message is an agent the Message Delivery hands it on to the PoBox. The PoBox has for each agent an interface called PoBoxAdder where the agents can send and receive messages. This is the only connection of an agent to a node. All communication between agents and nodes is handled over the PoBox using the PoBoxAdder. The PoBoxAdder describes the interface for putting messages into the queues. Besides the addMessage method of the PoBoxAdder there are no method references between nodes and agents.
The PoBox installs for each agent a queue for incoming messages. In the same manner each agent has a queue for messages sent by the PoBox. The queue lengths are managed dynamically by the possessing entity. This approach offers various security features which are described in the UbiMAS security section below.
Agent Node Peer Groups
The agent nodes can form alliances in form of peer groups independent from the middleware peer groups. If two peers want to build a peer group they have to arrange new pipes which are built using a pipe advertisement. The advertisement contains a unique pipe ID. Only the peers which know this ID can receive the messages sent over this pipe. Figure 2 shows an example for UbiMAS peer groups. Each agent node which wants to join a peer group must send a request. The peer group members can decide if this request will be accepted or rejected. Inside of a peer group the agent nodes communicate over a secure communication protocol. Messages to foreign nodes outside the peer group are still possible but are not secured.
Different peer groups can build a partnership. Applied to an office building each floor could build a peer group, and floors of the same institution could form an alliance. This makes it possible for agent nodes to communicate with nodes from other peer groups. Besides UbiMAS there are other services, e.g. Location Services, using the same middleware for communication. Mobile Agents can register for events of these services and will be informed when new events occur. In this way agents can be notified by sensor events from the environment or location events of particular persons.
UbiMAS Mobile Agents
Agents in UbiMAS are started as single threads on the actual node. An agent reacts to messages, i.e. the agent is in a loop where it waits for incoming messages. A UbiMAS node can host several agents. There are two types of agents in UbiMAS: user-agents and service-agents. Both agent types descend from an abstract agent that defines different basic methods for communication and security functions.
Agents can communicate with each other using messages. An agent must implement functions which are performed when a specific message is received. If an agent doesn't know the message type it ignores the message. The abstract agent defines methods for creating and sending messages. The agent nodes serve here as mediators. Messages addressed to a local available mobile agent are forwarded directly to the recipient agent by the local PoBox. If the agent is on another node the message is transferred first to this node. Each agent is identified over a unique ID. UbiMAS supports message encryption. Each node owns a certificate, a public and a private key. Each agent has an own key pair for message encryption. The abstract agent defines further data structures for security keys of the agent and the public key of the actual host. Furthermore there are methods for requesting public keys of other agents or nodes.
Below are some methods of the abstract agent described. To send a message an agent performs: -createAgentMessage is called by an agent when it wants to send a new message. It returns an prepared UbiMAS message where the ID of the calling agent is set into the sender information by the PoBoxAdder. -encodeAgentMessage: The agent can encode the contents of the message using the coding methods RSA or DES. As key the agent uses the public key of the receiver agent or node. -sendToAgent and sentToHost are called by an agent when it wants to send a message to another agent or to a node. The PoBoxAdder puts the message into the queue of the PoBox.
Moreover if an agent receives a new message the following methods are called:
The PoBoxAdder calls this method to put a message into the queue of an agent. -decodeAgentMessage: If the message is encoded the agent can decode the contents of the message with his private key.
For migration the agent calls:
-sendAgent: If an agent wants to migrate to another host it calls this method. The agent code is serialized and packed as a byte stream into a message and is sent to the PoBox. The PoBox sends the message to the receiver node and destroys the agent after receiving an acknowledgement.
Extending this abstract agent we implemented a user-agent that can receive location messages concerning its user and migrate to the node next to this location. The user-agent can get instructions and data over a GUI directly from the user and can ask for service-agents assigning them to perform a specific service. There are three service-agents implemented. The last section describes the service-agents and the application scenarios in detail.
UbiMAS Security
The security architecture of UbiMAS aims to protect both the agents and nodes against malicious behaviors. A secure system is essential for the acceptance of the reflective mobile agent approach because personal data is sensitive [6] . In [4] the author defines four security issues specific to mobile agent systems. These are:
-protection of the host against agents, -protection of agents against other agents, -protection of agents against host, and -protection of the underlying network.
Each involved entity of the mobile agent system can be regarded as a potential intruder. Malicious agents could be used to forward confidential information or to attack other entities. Nodes have full access to the agent code and therefore could clone agents, manipulate the migration path or attack the host PCs. The host PCs and the communication network offer a broad basis for attacks on the agent communication and migration. There are other entities who could endanger the agent system, like administrators, authors, owners, and agent users. The administrator installs, configures, and maintains the mobile agent system. He could arbitrarily manipulate the system. The author develops the mobile agents and could build a Trojan horse or hidden functions. In some cases the owner and the user of mobile agents are different persons. The owner describes the person who feeds the system with agents. He could consciously bring malicious agents into the system. The user can't bring new agents into the system but utilizes the agents and could apply many agents trying to start a Denial-of-Service attack. To stem the potential attacks UbiMAS realizes various security approaches which are described below.
Protection of Agents Against Hosts:
UbiMAS assumes only trustful nodes. The nodes are installed by an administrator. We assume here social protection mechanisms. The administrator and author of the agent nodes are known. It is supposed that these persons will act trustful in their own interest. Infiltration of foreign nodes is not possible because of certificates and keys for each service. Furthermore only UbiMAS peers of the same application can form a peer group. Each peer group has its own certificate which is validated during communication. All messages in UbiMAS are coded using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) approaches. If the sender node doesn't know the public key of the receiver it first asks for it and stores it for future communication. The main point therefore is to protect the agent node and agents against malicious mobile agents.
Protection of Agents and Hosts Against Rogue Agents:
The first step in this direction is to secure the message exchange between agents and nodes. Our solution is the PoBoxAdder which has several protection functionalities. Protection against impersonating is realized through the property that the sender of messages isn't set by the agent but by the PoBoxAdder. This means that an agent can't describe as another agent. Furthermore the PoBox has a limited queue for messages. The node can change the length of each queue dynamically. Agents can only send until the queue is full. Besides this the node can set a timer. The agents have to wait until the timer is expired before they can send a new message. The messages of all different PoBox queues are served by a fair scheduling algorithm, e.g. FIFO. This makes denial of service attacks by agents against nodes more difficult. In the case of an attack the node can set the queue-length of the concerning agent to zero blocking further sendings.
One more protection approach results by avoidance of references. This means that no mobile agent knows direct references on the node or other agents, i.e. the agent can't call external functions or access external data. The only interface for communication is the PoBoxAdder. Each agent reaching the actual node gets the public key of this node. All messages which the agent sends to the PoBoxAdder are coded with the public key of the node. In the same way the node codes messages to an agent with its public key. So even if an other agent gets this messages it has no possibility to decode the information. With this approach UbiMAS can allow all kinds of agents, even malicious ones.
To provide platform independence UbiMAS is implemented in Java. To execute an agent the node has to know its class. The agent usually migrates with its class. The node has the responsibility for securing that the agent code won't be manipulated during migration. This is done by encryption. However, here a security gap may arise because agents could be started with the wrong class which have the same name as the agent class. UbiMAS ensures that mobile agents are always loaded with the right class. If the class isn't known the node requests it from the sender node. Since in UbiMAS there is no limitation for agents and agent authors it is impossible to avoid name conflicts through a name convention. To avoid name collisions each agent has its own class loader. This enables separation of name spaces. Since generic classes could be loaded redundantly we differentiate between standard and non-standard agent classes. The agent node implements a standard class loader that loads the communication classes. Remaining agent-specific classes are loaded by the agent class loader. In that way the communication classes are loaded only once on the node.
UbiMAS disallows cloning of agents. All user-agents are loaded only once per person. During migration the nodes observe that the agents are deleted after acknowledged transfer. The same service-agent can be loaded several times but each agent becomes its own unique ID, so there are no clones of service-agents, too.
In our office scenario service-agents are allowed to access resources on hosts. This access needs to be secured. This is done using the Security Manager of Java. The problem here is that the Security Manager protects the system only against applications. However mobile agents are not applications but implemented as threads. If the Security Manager would give permissions to an agent as application all agents on this node would get the same access. This is naturally not acceptable. What we need here is a permission system for single threads. The problem on threads is that the thread ID changes after agent migration, because each node starts a new thread for each received agent. To guarantee that only a specific agent gets the access rights on chosen resources it needs an access approach based on a unique identification technique independent from the thread ID. UbiMAS realizes a security extension of the Java Security Manager where rights on system resources can be applied for agent threads. The Security Manager requires several attributes like username, password, permission name, permission parameters, and a permission ID. To ensure that this permission ID is unique it is calculated using the agent ID and is decoded using public/private key mechanisms. Therefore the calculated ID is independent from the thread ID and is unique because all agent IDs are unique.
Besides the nodes the agents have their own private/public keys. To secure the message exchange the agents can encrypt the information in the messages with the public key of the receiver agent or node which subsequently decrypts it with its private key. Furthermore agents always store encrypted personal data of its user. There is no possibility to access this data because the only access to agents is by messages over the PoBox.
If an agent wants to migrate to another node it asks the node to send the agent to the destination. There are two methods for migration. The agent can ask for transfer directly to a node or it can ask for transfer to the node where a specific agent resides. For the second method the actual node may start a finding procedure for the destination agent. In both cases the agent that wants to be transferred waits for migration by sleeping. In that time the agent can still receive messages. The sender node tries to build a bidirectional connection to the receiver node. If this was possible, the node begins with transfer preparations. The node also uses private/public key encryption for agent migration. It serializes the agent code, uses the public key of the recipient node for encryption, and packs it into a message. Additionally the messages received for the current agent are attached to this message. The destination node realizes that the message has a mobile agent type. It decrypts the message with its private key, deserializes the agent, and wakes it up. After that the node delivers the messages to the agent which were received in meantime.
Application Scenarios and Evaluation
To evaluate UbiMAS we have implemented several Smart Doorplate scenarios and present here one user-agent scenario and three service-agent scenarios. For each user (employee or visitor) exists a user-agent as reflective agent, which is fed into the system when the person physically enters the building. The smart doorplates offer an interface between user-agent and the user. If a user wants to utilize a service, she stops in front of the next doorplate. The location tracking system based on RFID recognizes the user and fires an event containing the user ID. The user-agent catches this event and migrates to this smart doorplate. After authenticating herself the user can choose a service. If the user wants to go to an office and don't know the way she can ask her user-agent for navigating her. The user-agent then displays arrows in the direction the user has to go. Knowing the next doorplates the user will pass, the user-agent jumps ahead and shows the right direction. If the user reaches the destination the agent displays a reached message. Figure 3 shows a picture of one smart doorplate and figure  4 shows the floor of our institution with a smart doorplate at each door. Besides this scenario we have implemented three service-agents: an e-mail agent, a file reader agent and a file fetcher agent. In the e-mail scenario an employee uses her office PC to retrieve e-mails and can arrange to be notified if she expects a special e-mail. Because of security reasons she doesn't want to receive all her incoming mails on a foreign smart doorplate. She instructs her user-agent to check the e-mails appropriate to a special filter and to inform her when matching e-mails were found. The user-agent calls an e-mail service-agent and gives it the filter in coded form. At the same time it applies for the required rights on the host PC for checking e-mails. The service-agent moves now to the agent node on the host PC. There the host can validate the ID of the agent and can set the rights, which were requested by the user-agent before. Now the service-agent can search the received e-mails using the filter. If the agent finds a matching e-mail it migrates to the node where the user-agent is and gives the results to the user-agent. The file reader agent and the file fetcher agent perform in the same way. The first one only reads out a file, e.g. a log-file which the employee wants to see, and displays the contents on the doorplate. The file fetcher agent brings a specific file to a desired doorplate and stores it into a public folder. The movement of the mobile agent should be faster than the movement of the person. Usually the migration of the agent has some delay because the location tracking system takes some time to recognize the person and to fire an location event. In [1] we performed preliminary tests with Bluetooth and WLAN connected PDAs which showed insufficient transfer performance already for the basic system without encryption. As result, we based the doorplate system on ethernet connected PCs. In order to evaluate UbiMAS with its security extensions we measured the ping time (PT), i.e. the time an agent needs to jump from a node to another and back on the PC-based system. We increased the size of data carried by the mobile agent. The measurement is taken once with encryption/decryption the agent code during migration and once without encryption. Figure 5 describes the evaluation results. The results show that using security encryption increases the agent transfer time. Encryting more agent data needs more processing time. However the migration time is still acceptable for the reflective agent scenario.
Conclusion
This paper presented the Ubiquitous Mobile Agent System UbiMAS. UbiMAS grabs the idea that ubiquitous systems are responsible for storing personal user data and sending them to the actual location of the person where the system offers user specific services. This transfer of private information is the reason why UbiMAS cares much for security aspects. Mobile agents carry user specific information and perform services in the name of the person. It is essential that agents and nodes are protected against malicious agents. For this UbiMAS offers various security features. The PoBox is one of these used to ensure that no agent has references to other agents or nodes. We described the UbiMAS node peer infrastructure where new communication protocols are used for secure message exchange between agents and nodes. We implemented different scenarios for flexible office buildings with smart doorplates where we differentiated between user-agents and service-agents. The agent system bases on an autonomic middleware which provides additional application possibilities for the agent system. We currently explore how mobile agents can support the self-monitoring and self-configuring features of the autonomic middleware system. UbiMAS is designed in a generic way ensuring broad application possibilities.
